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In this paper, we provide a critical analysis of the theory of the expansionary austerity. We 
take the hotly debated contribution by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff on the 
supposedly negative relationship between public debt and economic growth (when the debt-
to-GDP ratio overcomes the 90 percent threshold) as the starting point of our analysis. We 
then move to analyze those contributions that more directly point to the possible 
expansionary outcomes of tough fiscal retrenchments. We eventually criticize the main 
conclusions of the expansionary austerity theory by presenting a simple short-run theoretical 
model. We show that fiscal consolidation might have expansionary outcomes only under 
extreme, very specific and uncertain circumstances. Expansionary austerity would hardly 
take place in the context of monetarily sovereign economies, or in presence of an 
accommodative monetary policy like that implemented by the ECB since late 2011, or in 
economic systems that are poorly integrated to international goods markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2010, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a hotly debated and influential paper,  
“Growth in a time of debt”. This work was a continuation of some previous contributions in which the 
two authors, together with Michael Savastano, developed the “debt intolerance” theory. According to 
the authors, the history of several developing and emerging countries clearly shows that the 
accumulation of public and private debt, in particular foreign debt, recurrently represented a source of 
economic instability, economic stagnation and recession. Such a negative and easy-to-emerge effect of 
developing countries’ (foreign) debt on their own macroeconomic performances is the result of the 
reluctance of (international) financial operators to accept even low levels of indebtedness in countries 
recording a long tradition of complicated debt management and serial defaults. 
In their 2010 article, Reinhart and Rogoff somehow extended the theory of the debt intolerance to 
the case of developed countries. More in detail, they asserted that a statistical negative correlation 
exists between economic growth and public debt when public debt stocks reach levels higher than 90 
percent of GDP. Accordingly, public debt stocks approaching the 90 percent (debt-to-GDP) threshold 
can represent a significant problem developed countries’ policymakers have to carefully deal with if 
they want to maintain and boost economic growth. 
Reinhart and Rogoff did not directly and explicitly pointed out quick fiscal corrections as the best 
strategy to tackle with the problem of increasing public debt stock in both the US and European 
countries. Nevertheless, two years after the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis and “Great 
Recession”, and the ensuing massive intervention by most governments worldwide to bail out close-to-
bankruptcy financial systems and avoid even deeper contractions, their empirical analysis was largely 
perceived as the definitive proof of the validity of the theory of “the expansionary fiscal austerity”, and 
of the need for a sudden return to fiscal consolidation. According to the former US House Budget 
Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, for instance, “economists who have studied sovereign debt tell us 
that letting total debt rise above 90 percent of GDP creates a drag on economic growth and intensifies 
the risk of a debt-fueled economic crisis”. Analogously, Olli Rehn, the former European 
Commissioner to EU economic and financial affairs, openly stated that “it is widely acknowledged 
[…] that when public debt levels rise about 90 percent they tend to have a negative economic 
dynamism, which translates into low growth for many years. That is why consistent and carefully 
calibrated fiscal consolidation remains necessary in Europe”.  
The long-lasting nature of some economic problems (i.e. an apparently endless recession in Greece 
and a permanently high level of unemployment – in particular youth unemployment – in Spain and 
Italy) in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, as well as pale economic performances if not signs 
of stagnation in some central economies like Netherlands, Finland and even Germany, have now 
sparked a heated debate on the reliability of the expansionary austerity hypothesis, and of the empirical 
analyses which underpin it, directly or indirectly. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a simple but comprehensive overview of the two conflicting 
hypotheses, i.e. the idea that well-designed fiscal consolidations may be conducive to growth even in 
the short run and even when implemented in a downswing, and the opposite traditional Keynesian-type 
rejection of restrictive fiscal measures in times of economic contraction. In particular, in Section 2 of 
this paper we first provide a brief analysis of the arguments put forward by the supporters of the 
expansionary austerity, and of the economic mechanisms through which expansionary fiscal 
consolidations might actually materialize. We also review both the critique to the above mentioned 
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work by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, as well as those contributions that point out the 
methodological flaws affecting the prevalently empirical literature that more directly developed the 
expansionary austerity logic. Section 2 closes with a brief look at some empirical evidence that may 
cast doubts on the solidity of the pillars of the expansionary austerity theory. Section 3 moves the 
focus of our analysis to the theory, and presents a simple short-run model that shows the specific 
economic conditions and assumptions that could make expansionary fiscal consolidation possible. We 
stress that the economic mechanisms at the basis of the expansionary austerity hypothesis are far from 
being automatic. Actually, they fundamentally depend on three core aspects: first, the highly uncertain 
favorable change in economic agents’ expectations in presence of tough and likely long-lasting fiscal 
corrections; second, the dynamics of interest rates on financial markets, as strongly influenced by the 
behavior of the domestic central bank and the way it conducts domestic monetary policy; third, the 
high sensitiveness of net exports to internal devaluation and improving exchange rate. Our conclusion 
is that the theoretical fundamentals of the expansionary austerity hypothesis are fragile and state- or 
institution-contingent. Therefore, they must be carefully re-considered and contextualized before using 
such theoretical apparatus as a general guide for fiscal policy.  
 
2. The empirical debate on the expansionary austerity theory 
 
The theory of expansionary austerity is part of a long-standing debate in economic literature on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy (at least in relative terms with respect to the effectiveness of monetary 
policy). Such a debate dates back to the 60s and to the theorization of the crowding-out effects of 
expansionary fiscal policies on private investments in the traditional IS/LM model. Such debate further 
developed during the 70s through the introduction of the well-known Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis, i.e. the idea that debt-financed fiscal policies are ineffective if economic agents anticipate 
future increases in taxation, and therefore immediately cut consumption and investment expenditures.   
Nonetheless, the theory of the “expansionary fiscal austerity” as we currently know it emerged at 
the beginning of the 90s when some economists stated that, at least under certain conditions, 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policies may have non-Keynesian effects, since that they may prove 
to be ineffective to stimulate economic activity and, at the same time, they may put at risk the solidity 
of public finances and of the whole financial system of the economy (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 
and 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010 and 2012)1. Symmetrically, those 
economists also argued through the analyses of some specific case studies that well-conceived fiscal 
restrictions might actually stimulate private consumption and investment expenditures, as well as 
improve export dynamics, so that the overall economic activity might eventually expand rather than 
contract (as stated by the standard Keynesian arguments).  
According to the supporters of the expansionary austerity, well-designed fiscal consolidations must 
take the form of deep, persistent and credible cuts in public expenditures, in particular public transfers 
and public employees’ wages, perhaps followed by reductions in the tax burden on households. In their 
view, such a shift in fiscal policy may constitute a “regime change” that may foster economic activity 
through three main mechanisms. First, successful fiscal corrections may positively affect the behavior 
                                                        
1 See Sutherland (1997) for the case of possible non-Keynesian effects of expansionary fiscal measures when undertaken in 
a context of high public debt. Perotti (2012) also stresses that fiscal contractions may indeed be expansionary in presence of 
high interest rates, in particular when they contribute to reduce risk premia on financial assets, on government bonds first 
of all, and prompt a considerable reduction in nominal interest rates.  
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of private economic actors, both households and firms, through the so-called “expectation channel”. 
Upfront public spending cuts, it is argued, may induce economic agents to elaborate optimistic 
expectations by anticipating future tax reductions and consequent increases in their own (permanent) 
income. This, in turn, may incentivize them to immediately raise consumption expenditures and to 
unleash investment programs, giving momentum to current economic activity. Second, tough fiscal 
corrections that prove to be effective in reducing public deficits and public debt stocks can stimulate 
investments and growth by re-establishing bond vigilantes’ trust in public finances’ solvency and 
prompting a significant reduction in interest rates. Last but not least, cuts in public wages that help to 
establish wage moderation on the labor market may give rise to a kind of internal devaluation that may 
eventually improve external competitiveness and foster net exports.   
Most part of the critiques to the theory of expansionary austerity address the weaknesses of the 
empirical analyses through which the expansionary austerity literature tries to validate its non-
Keynesian view of fiscal policy outcomes. As to the above mentioned article by Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoff (which, let’s repeat it for the sake of clarity, does not explicitly or directly point out 
expansionary austerity as the main way out of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis), harsh criticisms 
emerged after Herndon et al. (2014) demonstrated that the empirical analysis presented in that paper 
was badly flawed by some technical errors and by a debatable procedure for selecting and weighting 
cross-country data. As to the selection process in particular, Herndon et al. (2014) note that Reinhart 
and Rogoff voluntarily neglect to consider the positive average growth rates registered in Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand from 1946 to 1950 even in the presence of high public debt stocks. In the 
case of New Zealand, Reinhart and Rogoff consider data from 1951 only, when New Zealand 
plummeted in a bad recession with GDP contraction amounting to 7,6%. Even further, in their study 
Reinhart and Rogoff first re-group country level annual growth data into different sub-samples 
according to the corresponding public debt-to-GDP ratio. Four public debt-to-GDP categories are 
assumed: below 30 percent; between 30 and 60 percent; between 60 and 90 percent; higher than 90 
percent. In each sub-group, mean growth rates at country level are averaged in order to compute the 
average cross-country growth rate associated with each specific debt category. Through such an 
averaging strategy, the authors assign equal weights to each country in each specific debt-to-GDP sub-
sample without paying attention to the length of the timespan during which an economy falls into a 
given specific debt-to-GDP category. In the case of the “above 90 percent” category, the negative 
growth performance observed in New Zealand in only one year, i.e. in 1951, has the same relevance as 
the average positive growth rates registered in Greece and the UK over 19 years. Had Reinhart and 
Rogoff adopted the alternative weighing and averaging strategy proposed by Herndon et al. (2014), the 
average growth rate associated to the “above 90 percent” debt category would have been equal to 2 
percent rather than -0.1 percent. 
The economic analyses that more directly embrace and put forward the expansionary austerity 
standpoint generally build up their empirical tests on the concept of cyclically adjusted primary public 
balances 2  (henceforth CAPB), and take significant shifts 3  in countries’ CAPBs as signs of 
                                                        
2  The cyclically adjusted primary public budget (CAPB) is the difference between government expenditures and 
government revenues (net of interest payments) that would prevail should the economy work at full potential. Remarkable 
changes in a country CAPB are considered as genuine signs of discretionary fiscal measures since that they are “polished” 
from the effects that economic cycles, through the functioning of automatic stabilizers, would naturally have on actual 
primary public balances.      
3 Alesina and Perotti (1995), for instance, interpret improvements (deteriorations) in a country’s CAPB in the order of at 
least 1,5 percentage points over GDP as examples of “very tight” (“very loose”) discretionary fiscal policies. This is also 
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discretionary expansionary or restrictive fiscal policies. The authors then use the identified episodes of 
fiscal adjustments to econometrically explain cross-country growth performances and public debt 
dynamics in the years following the launch of discretionary fiscal packages.  
Criticisms to such a methodology are mostly based on the fact that the adopted measures of 
cyclically adjusted primary balances are not capable to completely remove the effects of the economic 
cycles on the evolution of public finances, no matter how carefully the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance itself is defined and computed (see Guajardo et al., 2011; Baker and Rosnick, 2014). For 
instance, during phases of economic expansion the prices of financial assets usually tend to increase, 
this way improving primary public balances by raising tax revenues. However, such an effect of the 
economic cycle on public finances is not detected by the above mentioned CAPB-centered 
methodology. Eventually, a pure cyclical component of public balance dynamics, which is positively 
correlated with the economic cycle, is misinterpreted and wrongly accounted for a discretionary 
restrictive fiscal policy shock. The positive correlation between apparent fiscal consolidation and 
economic expansion is easy to emerge, but it is the outcome of a biased empirical approach and the 
econometric misunderstanding of rather different economic mechanisms.  
On top of the above mentioned problem of precisely computing the CAPB, a perhaps more relevant 
causality issue does emerge. Very likely, fiscal variables and economic growth feedback on each other 
and both emerge as endogenous variables. The causality runs both ways: fiscal policy can surely 
influence economic performances, positively or negatively. Economic dynamics, in turn, has clear 
implications in terms of improving or worsening public balances, as well as on the type of fiscal 
stances governmental authorities follow4 . The results of the CAPB-based literature may thus be 
misleading simply because they take changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as the 
exogenous explicative variable of economic dynamics, whist it is the endogenous one.  
In order to address such an estimation problem, Guajardo et al. (2011) suggest an alternative 
method to identify episodes of fiscal adjustment. This approach is based on the direct analysis of fiscal 
authorities’ historical documents and decisions. What eventually emerges from the adoption of this 
alternative methodology is that “a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation reduces real private 
consumption by 0.75 percent within two years, while real GDP declines by 0.62 percent […] Our main 
finding that fiscal consolidation is contractionary holds up in cases where one would most expect fiscal 
consolidation to raise private domestic demand. In particular, even large spending-based fiscal 
retrenchments are contractionary, as are fiscal consolidations occurring in economies with a high 
perceived sovereign default risk (Guajardo et al., 2011, p.29)”. 
The above results are in turn consistent with the findings of an expanding and rather transversal 
(among different economic theories) body of literature that has recently rescued from oblivion the 
concept of fiscal multiplier. Indeed, such literature stresses that the size of fiscal multiplier may vary 
over the business cycle and it may be particularly large during recessions (Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Qazizada and Stockhammer, 2015). Of course, this evidence is radically at odds 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the definition of fiscal adjustment followed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010). Alesina and Ardagna (2012), on the contrary, 
adopt a more complex definition of fiscal adjustment, according to which “a fiscal adjustment is either 1) a two year period 
in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance/GDP improves in each year and the cumulative improvement is at least 
two points of the balance/GDP ratio; a three year or more period in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance over 
GDP improves in each year and the cumulative improvement is eat least three points of the Balance/GDP ratio (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2012, pp. 5 – 6)”. 
4 Policy makers, for instance, may adopt a restrictive fiscal policy stance as a response to, and in order to tame excessive 
economic expansions putting at risk price stability and overheating the economy. Here fiscal policy adjustments are a 
consequence rather than the determinants of economic growth.  
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with the concept of negative fiscal multiplier implicitly advocated by the expansionary austerity 
doctrine. 
A further assessment of the methodological robustness of the expansionary austerity theory is out of 
the scope of the present paper, as it is any detailed estimation of a positive or negative fiscal multiplier. 
Yet, before moving the analysis to the theoretical model developed in Section 3, we give a brief look at 
some recent empirical data in order to get a prima facie feeling of how some stylized facts seem to 
contradict the main assumptions and economic mechanisms theorized by the expansionary austerity 
literature. 
Figure 1 provides a general overview of the size of fiscal adjustments taking place in a series of 
developed economies since 2006. More in detail, in Figure 1 we show structural primary balances, and 
hence their annual change, for the countries under observations according to data and forecasts from 
the IMF and the OECD.  
 
Figure 1 – General government structural primary balance as a ratio to GDP % in selected developed 
countries, 2006 – 2016.         
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data and forecasts from IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2015) and 
OECD Economic Outlook (2015). 
 
From Figure 1, it emerges strikingly clear the wide variety in the intensity of fiscal adjustments 
characterizing the economies at hand. Since 2010, fiscal retrenchments have been much tougher in 
peripheral eurozone countries than in central economies and in “stand-alone” countries5 . Among 
peripheral eurozone countries, structural primary balances moved from highly negative values in the 
immediate aftermath of the world financial crisis to significantly positive ones in Greece and Portugal 
                                                        
5 In this paper, we follow De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and we label “stand-alone” economies those countries that maintain full 
monetary sovereignty by denominating the domestic public debt in their own currency and by maintaining a national 
central bank (associated to domestic fiscal institutions) that could freely intervene on financial markets to backstop public 
finances in case of need.   
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since 2012. Ireland and Spain have registered structural primary surpluses in 2014. In the case of Italy, 
positive structural primary balances over the whole period picked up in 2012, and are expected to 
remain at remarkably high levels onwards. Interestingly, structural primary deficits, albeit decreasing, 
did not switch into positive in all the three “stand-alone” economies we take into account. In the case 
of the UK, this means that the kind of fiscal adjustment implemented so far has been milder with 
respect to that of peripheral eurozone countries despite the pro-austerity rhetoric of the leading 
conservative party. In the case of the allegedly virtuous Finland, the structural primary balance is 
negative and around 1 percent of GDP since 2009. In the case of Germany, it is positive even though it 
is expected to decrease in the upcoming years and it should achieve much lower values than the 
corresponding figures in peripheral eurozone countries. Other way around, in Germany there is not any 
sign of the dramatic switch in public balance experienced in the periphery of the eurozone. 
In this general picture, Figures 2, 3 and 4 go to the heart of the expansionary austerity doctrine and 
test the relationship existing between annual fiscal adjustments and year-on-year economic dynamics 
for the sample of developed countries considered in Figure 1. According to common practice in the 
expansionary austerity literature, fiscal adjustment is defined as the year-on-year change in structural 
primary balance. In Figure 2, we show how fiscal adjustment is correlated to overall economic growth. 
In Figures 3 and 4 we see how it is related to the dynamics of private consumption and gross capital 
formation respectively. Contrary to what expected by the supporters of the expansionary austerity, in 
Figure 2 we find out a negative correlation between fiscal adjustment and GDP growth. Such a 
negative correlation gets even stronger when we take private consumption (Figure 3) and gross capital 
formation (Figure 4) as dependent variables. 
The analysis presented in Figures 2 – 4 is overly simple to constitute any definitive proof against 
expansionary austerity. Yet, it shows that it is hard to find any sign of austerity-led growth spurt in 
developed economies in the most recent years. Indeed, since 2010 to 2013, in eurozone countries 
where austerity measures have been extensively implemented, positive contributions to economic 
recovery have come by external factors mainly, i.e. increasing export flows, but certainly not by those 
domestic components of GDP that, according to the expansionary austerity theory, fiscal corrections 
were expected to positively stimulate (see Figure 5 below). 
Even further, export dynamics has been appreciable in a small export-oriented country such as 
Ireland, which has very likely benefitted of tight commercial integration with non-eurozone countries 
such as the UK and the USA. But this does apply in a much lesser extent to Portugal and Spain. In 
Italy and, above all, in Greece, export dynamics has been disappointing at the very least. Accordingly, 
there are serious doubts on the allegedly positive effect fiscal austerity may have on export 
performances by inducing an internal devaluation. Should this channel be at work, if ever, its 
effectiveness likely depends on country-specific factors. For sure, it cannot be taken as a given well-
established and universal regularity. 
One possible reply by expansionary austerity’s supporters is that the dismal results of austerity in 
most developed economies, in peripheral eurozone countries in particular, might be the consequence of 
the wrong implementation of austerity measures themselves, with emphasis misplaced on tax increases 
rather than spending cuts. Empirical evidence does not provide support to such a rebuttal. Following 
Tamborini (2015), what stylized facts tell us is that cumulative primary spending cuts from 2010 to 
2013 outstripped by far relatively small tax increases in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Ironically, 
cumulative primary public spending increased vigorously rather than decrease in Germany, Finland, 
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Netherlands and the USA. In the UK, austerity was mainly tax-based, with public expenditures being 
almost constant since 2010 to 2013. 
 
Figure 2 – Correlation between annual change in structural primary balance and GDP growth, selected 
developed countries, 2011 – 2014. 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
Figure 3 – Correlation between annual change in structural primary balance and private consumption’s 
annual growth rate, selected developing countries, 2011 – 2013. 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from UNCTAD. 
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Figure 4 – Correlation between annual change in structural primary balance and gross capital 
formation’s annual growth rate, selected developed economies, 2011 – 2013. 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Contribution to 2010-2013 overall economic growth by Households’ (HH) final 
consumption, gross capital formation, and export flows, selected developed economies.  
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from UNCTAD. 
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In the five panels composing Figure 6, we address the additional pillar of the expansionary austerity 
building, i.e. the positive effect fiscal consolidation may have on economic activity by restoring bond 
vigilantes’ trust in public finance’s solidity, hence reducing interest rates and ultimately crowding-in 
private investments.  
  
Figure 6 – Structural primary balance and 10-year government bonds’ yields in Greece (panel a), 
Ireland (panel b), Italy (panel c), Portugal (panel d), Spain (panel e), 2006 – 2014. 
(a)                                                                         (b) 
 
(c)                                                                         (d) 
 
(e) 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2015) and OECD Economic 
Outlook (2015). 
 
In Figure 6 we analyze this point applied to the case of the so-called GIPSI eurozone countries, i.e. 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. The stylized facts reported in Figure 6 are particularly 
interesting when they are compared to the same figures related to “stand-alone” countries and to some 
central eurozone economies (see Figures 7 and 8 respectively). In the case of the peripheral eurozone 
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countries, 10-year government bonds’ yields hiked up when tough austerity measures started to be 
implemented or were underway. This is astonishingly clear in the case of Greece. When we move our 
attention to “stand-alone” countries, a completely different dynamics emerges. Interest rates on 
government bonds started to decline in the immediate aftermath of the world financial crisis. And they 
decreased remarkably even in presence of discretionary fiscal stimuli that triggered off large 
deteriorations in primary structural balances. Last but not least, since 2007 10-year government bonds’ 
yields have decreased also in central eurozone countries such as Finland, Germany and Netherlands. In 
the case of Finland and Netherlands, it is worth stressing that, contrary to what observed in the 
periphery of the eurozone, such a trend was associated to widening primary structural deficits in the 
years following the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis and of the “Great Recession”. 
The analysis of Figures 6 – 8, together with a more detailed look at monthly interest rate data (see 
Figure A1 in Appendix A to the paper) and capital movements, reveals that financial operators do not 
judge the implementation of fiscal corrections as a relevant factor in order to assess public finance’s 
solidity, and determine government bonds’ riskiness and interest rate yields. What actually seems to be 
more important is the net debtor/net creditor position accumulated on international financial markets 
(as mirrored by protracted current account deficits/surpluses), and the institutional framework, i.e. the 
degree of connection between monetary and fiscal authorities, in which government bonds are issued. 
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012), for instance, show that Greece and Ireland started to be hit by 
sudden stops and capital reversals due to external factors such as the 2007 – 2008 financial shock. 
Accordingly, turbulences on the market for Greek and Irish sovereign bonds, and upward pressures on 
the corresponding yields, emerged in the second half of the 2008 (see grey area in Figure A1 in 
Appendix A), even though there was no sign of the upcoming sovereign debt crisis at that time yet. In 
a way, what commenced as a standard Balance-of-Payment crisis eventually triggered off a knock-on 
effect and turned into a widespread public debt crisis passing by the public bailout of domestic private 
financial sectors (in Ireland in particular) and the financial contagion of other internationally indebted 
peripheral eurozone countries. 
Into this picture, Lavoie (2015) notes that the intrinsic institutional flaws of the European Monetary 
Union decisively contributed to give rise and fuel the crisis. We refer, in particular, to the detachment 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) from national Treasures (and from any still-not-existing 
centralized eurozone fiscal authority), and to its impediment, sanctioned by law in its own Statute, to 
act as purchaser of last resort on national bonds’ markets. It is easy to see how such constitutional 
constraints to the operativeness of the ECB restrain it from backstopping public finances in case of 
need, make public finances over-dependent on financial markets’ sentiments, and open wide space for 
confidence crises. By the same token, it is equally telling that government bonds’ yields of most 
peripheral eurozone countries declined sharply after that the ECB took a much more interventionist 
stance by launching the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and by announcing the Outright 
Monetary Transaction (see blue areas in Figure A1). On the one hand, the former program indirectly 
calmed down government bonds’ interest rates via government bonds’ purchases by refinanced banks. 
On the other hand, the well-known Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” statement and the subsequent 
OMT program has directly put an end to financial speculation on (peripheral economies) sovereign 
bonds’ markets.  
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Figure 7 – Structural primary balance and 10-year government bonds’ yields in Canada (panel a), UK 
(panel b), and US (panel c), 2006 – 2014. 
(a)                                                                         (b)  
 
(c) 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2015) and OECD Economic 
Outlook (2015). 
 
Following De Grauwe (2011), these same limitations do not apply to the case of “stand-alone” 
countries, where domestic central banks could be eventually forced to intervene, snap off financial 
speculation and calm down financial distress on domestic government bonds’ markets. This is why it 
turns out clear from Figure 8 that financial operators, at least in the most recent years, seem not to pay 
any concern to highly expansionary fiscal policy stances, large deficits, and fast growing debt-to-GDP 
ratios in “stand-alone” countries such as the UK, the USA and Canada.  
For the purpose of this paper, what matters is that all the above mentioned facts seem to contradict 
the overly simplistic view put forward by the supporters of the expansionary austerity according to 
which tough fiscal correction is the right policy to take in order to stabilize financial markets in time of 
distress. Indeed, expansionary fiscal policies appear to be mostly irrelevant to influence financial 
markets’ sentiments in the case of monetarily sovereign countries. For sure, they did not trigger off any 
run against government bonds. In turn, front loaded fiscal contractions taken during deep recessions 
did not deliver the expected results in externally indebted peripheral eurozone countries, which had 
previously lost their monetary sovereignty by joining the European Monetary Union.       
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Figure 8 – Structural primary balance and 10-year government bonds’ yields in Finland (panel a), 
Germany (panel b), Netherlands (panel c), 2006 – 2014. 
(a)                                                                           (b) 
 
(c) 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2015) and OECD Economic 
Outlook (2015). 
 
3. A simple short-run model of the expansionary/contractionary effects of fiscal adjustments 
 
Most of the contributions discussed so far question and criticize the empirical validity of the 
expansionary austerity hypothesis. However, they do not address the in-depth theoretical consistency 
of such a theory. To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies have aimed at showing and 
enlightening the theoretical or logical fragility of the expansionary austerity doctrine from a non-
mainstream perspective.  
Demopoulos and Yannacopoulus (2012), and Robert Boyer (2012) provide argumentative analyses 
of the theoretical weaknesses affecting the expansionary austerity perspective, and highlight how there 
is “no general theoretical reason to guarantee the success of any austerity policy (Boyer, 2012, p.297)”.  
Demopoulos and Yannacopoulus (2012) review all the abovementioned mechanisms through which 
fiscal corrections may supposedly have expansionary outcomes. They then attack the concrete 
effectiveness of these same mechanisms. On the one hand, they criticize the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis that lies behind the possible austerity-induced expansion of private consumption. In 
particular, they stress that consumers would hardly smooth consumption inter-temporally and increase 
current consumption in sight of future expected reductions in income taxes if liquidity constraints are 
binding6 and/or the degree of Keynesian uncertainty about (the timing and amount of) future tax cuts is 
                                                        
6 A formal analysis of the consequences binding liquidity constraints may have on inter-temporal consumption smoothing 
would require to allow households to finance consumption, at least partially, through debt. In the context of modern 
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high. On the other hand, they also note that, in a standard open-economy IS-LM model with fixed 
exchange rate, the so-called “financial channel” is not operative since that interest rates are set 
exogenously on international financial markets.  
Robert Boyer (2012), in turn, surveys the specific conjunctures and circumstances under which, in 
the past, austerity measures might have been expansionary in a few small open economies.  
These studies, although interesting, do not provide a formal treatment of their analyses. In a way, 
they do not frame their arguments into a perhaps simple model through which one can juxtapose 
expansionary and contractionary effects of austerity programs, and quantitatively assess how and 
under which (economic-institutional) circumstances (i.e. parametrical settings) the former might 
prevail on the latter.  
Thomas Palley (2010) does elaborate a post-Keynesian demand-driven closed-economy model 
showing the short-run effects of fiscal rules imposing limits to debt-to-GDP ratios. Taking inspiration 
from a previous paper by Canale at al. (2008), Foresti and Marani (2014) in turn propose a simple 
short-run model in which fiscal austerity may have expansionary outcomes depending, among other 
factors, on the degree of interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, and on the intensity of the 
accommodative stance taken by monetary policy in presence of fiscal retrenchments. 
In the present paper, we present a simple theoretical model, which is a sort of open-economy 
version of the previous model presented by Palley (2010). In our model, we propose a more general 
framework than Palley does. Indeed, Palley’s theoretical exercise in-built result is that austerity 
measures inevitably lead to economic contraction. We think such a property of his model to be 
unsatisfactory and to constitute a shortcoming of the model itself. From our point of view, it makes no 
sense to criticize the effectiveness of fiscal austerity (and the solidity of the expansionary austerity 
hypothesis) through a theoretical framework that assumes, a priori, contractionary fiscal consolidation. 
Rather, we think that a more effective critique of expansionary austerity ought to point out the specific 
and perhaps extreme and unrealistic conditions under which it could materialize. This is what we try to 
show in the present paper. 
In their work, Foresti and Marani (2014) define austerity as a temporary and/or permanent reduction 
in public deficit7 . On the one hand, they do not enter into the details of expansionary austerity 
prescriptions, and do not address the specific policy measures that, according to the expansionary 
austerity literature, should compose a possibly successful fiscal austerity package. On the other hand, 
they implicitly take the positive effect of fiscal measures on public deficit as granted. With respect to 
Foresti and Marani (2014), in this paper we propose a model, which is, at the same time, more specific 
in the analysis of the policy measures composing austerity packages, and more general in the type of 
results it may give rise. As to the first point, here we explicitly take into account and model some of 
the peculiar measures expansionary austerity supporters advocate, i.e. cuts in public transfers and in 
public employees’ salaries. This way, we depart from a simplistic and perhaps rough identification of 
austerity measures with reductions in public deficit. As to the second point, our model allows for a 
wider range of outcomes of the above austerity measures on public deficit. In our model, austerity 
measures may squeeze public deficits in the event they turn out to be effective and have an 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
financialized and increasingly unequal developed economies, this is a concrete eventuality, since that consumption 
expenditures from low-income households have increasingly relied upon banks’ loans. However, for the sake of simplicity, 
in the present model we neglect to take into account a possible link between consumption expenditures and banks’ loans to 
households.   
7 Foresti and Marani (2014) do not clearly define what they do mean as temporary or permanent reductions in public 
deficit.   
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expansionary impact on economic activity. Such a result, however, is by no mean automatic. Rather, 
austerity measures may also lead to counterintuitive results, i.e. a worsening public balance deficit, if 
they make economic recession even deeper. In this sense, differently from the above mentioned 
contributions, our paper shows more explicitly the interaction between economic activity and public 
finance’s variables.           
More in general, the purpose of our model is to give formal substance to the above quotation taken 
from Boyer (2012). Somehow, we aim at showing formally that the expansionary effects of fiscal 
austerity are by no mean automatic, but rather depend on a series of contingent factors, as well as on 
peculiar or country-specific institutional arrangements. Accordingly, expansionary austerity is not to 
perceive as a well-established natural rule on the base of which policy makers should inform the 
design of fiscal policies. 
In this model, we focus on short-run dynamics, in particular on the effects of restrictive fiscal 
adjustments on economic activity and on public balance deficit. Our purpose is to analyze and 
criticize, from a theoretical point of view, the assertion by Alberto Alesina according to which “many 
even sharp reductions of budget deficits [assuming that fiscal austerity effectively contributes to lower 
budget deficits] have been accompanied and immediately followed by sustained growth rather than 
recessions even in the very short run [cursive is of the authors] (Alesina, 2010, p.3)”. We assume that 
the economy does not work at full potential in order to allow for possible (fiscal) policy-driven 
expansions of aggregate demand and, hence, current economic activity. Indeed, the expansionary 
austerity literature argues that well-designed fiscal adjustments may boost economic activity through 
both a demand channel, i.e. by stimulating private consumption, investment expenditures and export 
demand, and a supply channel, i.e. by affecting the total supply of labor. In this paper, we focus only 
on the operativeness of the first channel, since that the supply channel will reasonably show its effects 
in a medium/long-run time horizon only8.  
Due to the short-run perspective of our analysis, we assume all stock variables, i.e. the home 
economy capital stock K, public debt D, and the total amount of (past and present) private sector’s 
borrowing from banks CR, as given. In this framework, equations (1) – (8) describe the supply side on 
the economy; equations (9) – (14) describe the demand side; equations (15) – (17), finally, formalize 
the public budget and the financial side of our economy, i.e. how the interest rates are determined and 
how they change. 
  
The production/supply side block: 
 
Equation (1) tells us that production (Y) is carried out through a fixed-coefficient production function, 
with N as the employed labor force and α as the average labor productivity. 
  
(1) 𝑌 = 𝛼𝑁                                                            
 
Equation (2) defines potential output (Y*) as the production level that would be realized in the event 
that total labor force (L) is fully employed. Equation (3) gives us the output/capital ratio as the product 
                                                        
8 Alesina and Ardagna (2010), for instance, argue that lower public sector employment, lower public sector wages, and (or) 
lower degrees of labor market protection (say cut in unemployment benefits), tend to increase individual labor supply and 
reduce trade unions’ bargaining power. It is easy to see how these effects of fiscal adjustments may stimulate growth in 
supply-side mainstream models.   
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between capacity utilization χ (= Y/Y*), which is a measure of the output gap, and β (=Y*/K), that is the 
highest degree of capital utilization achievable when production is at full potential9. 
 
(2) 𝑌∗ = 𝛼𝐿                                                             
 
(3) 
𝑌
𝐾
=
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗
𝐾
= 𝜒𝛽 
 
According to equations (1) and (2), equations (4) and (4.b) define total unemployment U and the 
unemployment rate u, respectively. 
 
(4) 𝑈 = 𝐿 − 𝑁 or (4.b) 𝑢 =
𝐿−𝑁
𝐿
= 1 −
𝑌
𝛼𝐿
= 1 − 𝜒 
 
Equations (5), (6) and (7) define the nominal wage rate w, the domestic price level pH, and the real 
exchange rate q. In equation (6), domestic firms set the domestic price level pH by applying a mark-up 
m on variable unit costs w/α. In equation (5), nominal wages are established through a bargaining 
process between trade unions and firms. More in detail, we assume the nominal wage w to be 
positively related to the expected price level pe and the degree of labor market protection z, which is in 
turn a positive function of unemployment benefits bu. We also assume current nominal wage rates to 
be negatively influenced by previous period unemployment u-1, since that it would reduce trade 
unions’ bargaining strength in the current round of wage negotiations. 
 
(5) 𝑤 = 𝑝𝑒𝑙(𝛼, 𝑢−1, 𝑧(𝑏𝑢)) 
 
(6) 𝑝𝐻 = (1 +𝑚)
𝑤
𝛼
 
 
(7) 𝑞 =
𝑒𝑝𝐹
𝑝𝐻
=
𝑒𝑝𝐹𝛼
(1+𝑚)𝑝𝑒𝑙(𝛼,𝑢−1,𝑧(𝑏𝑢))
 
 
Equation (8) simply states that the value of production is distributed among the total wage bill W 
and aggregate profits Π. 
 
(8) 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑊 +𝛱 = 𝑤𝑁 + 𝛱 
 
The demand side block: 
 
In the demand-side block, equation (9) simply gives us the equilibrium condition on the goods market 
and makes explicit all the components of the aggregate demand, i.e. domestic consumption C, 
domestic investments I, public purchases G, and net exports NX. 
 
(9) 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋 
 
                                                        
9 In our model we assume that there is plenty of capital stock, and that possible bottlenecks on the supply side of the 
economy come from shortages of labor rather than capital. 
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Equation (10) describes aggregate consumption as a function of wage earners’ and profit earners’ 
saving propensities, sw and sπ respectively. Total consumption depends on disposable income. In the 
case of wage earners, this is defined as the sum of the total wage bill W (= wN), public transfers TrG 
and unemployment benefits buU provided by the domestic social security system. The domestic 
government levies a tax rate tw on this kind of income. Profit earners’ income is given by the 
difference between total profits Π minus interest payments on the total amount of (past and present) 
loans received from banks, i.e. icrCR. The tax rate levied on net profits is tπ. In this model, the domestic 
bank system gets interests on the outstanding amount of private loans (CR) and public debt D. We 
assume that it does not pay any interest rate on deposits possibly held by households. For the sake of 
simplicity, we also assume that banks save all their realized profits (i.e. the difference between positive 
and negative interests), so that banks’ profits do not play any role in determining aggregate 
consumption. 
For the sake of simplicity, equation (10.B) scales down aggregate consumption for the capital stock K. 
Accordingly, ρ and λ stand for normalized values of public transfers and private debt, respectively. 
 
(10) 𝐶 = (1 − 𝑠𝑤)(1 − 𝑡𝑤)[𝑤𝑁 + 𝑇𝑟
𝐺 + 𝑏𝑢𝑈] + (1 − 𝑠𝜋)(1 − 𝑡𝜋)[Π − 𝑖𝑐𝑟𝐶𝑅] or: 
 
(10.b) 
𝐶
𝐾
= (1 − 𝑠𝑤)(1 − 𝑡𝑤) [𝜒
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤 − 𝑏𝑢) + 𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+ 𝜌] + (1 − 𝑠𝜋)(1 − 𝑡𝜋)[𝑟 − 𝑖𝑐𝑟𝜆] 
 
Equation (11) defines the current growth rate of the capital stock. In particular, we assume (I/K) to 
be a positive linear function of capacity utilization χ and of the profit share r (with a and ν as the 
corresponding parameters)10. Domestic investments are also negatively affected by the interest rate icr 
on banks’ loans via parameter h. Keynesian-type animal spirits, finally, are captured by parameter σ. 
 
(11) 
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝜎 + 𝑎𝜒 + 𝜐𝑟 − ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑟 
 
Equation (12) gives us public purchases, once again normalized for the existing capital stock K, as 
an exogenous policy variable γ. 
(12) 
𝐺
𝐾
= 𝛾 
 
In equation (13), normalized net exports are a linear positive function of the real exchange rate q, 
whilst they depend negatively on domestic capacity utilization χ. 
 
(13) 
𝑁𝑋
𝐾
= 𝜖𝑞𝑞 − 𝜖𝜒𝜒 
 
Finally, equation (14) introduces a crucial assumption that directly hinges upon the expansionary 
austerity literature. In fact, equation (14) assumes that, in an intertemporal time framework and 
according to, say, a permanent income argument, current households’ saving propensity may depend 
positively on the expected future tax rate tw
e. Current cuts in public expenditures, if sufficiently strong 
and reliable, may induce households to increase current consumption since that they may expect a 
lower tax burden tomorrow. By the same token, we also assume households’ saving propensity to 
                                                        
10 Our formalization of the investment function takes inspiration from Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
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depend negatively on public transfers. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that a permanent cut in public 
transfers, perhaps due to the policy decision of downsizing the provisions of the domestic welfare 
system (read a less generous domestic pension system), may also induce households to adopt a 
precautionary stance and save more today in anticipation of lower public transfers tomorrow11.  
 
(14) 𝑠𝑤 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑤
𝑒 , 𝑇𝑟𝐺) with (𝜕𝑠𝑤/𝜕𝑡𝑤
𝑒 ) > 0; (𝜕𝑠𝑤/𝜕𝑇𝑟
𝐺) < 0 
  
Public budget/financial side block: 
 
In the financial block, equation (15) gives public balance deficit as the simple difference between 
government outlays, i.e. government purchases, public transfers, the total amount of unemployment 
benefits and interest payments on public debt idD, and government revenues from taxes on households 
and firms. Equation (15.B) normalizes the public balance deficit for the capital stock K, with Δ = D/K.  
 
(15) 𝐵 = 𝐺 + 𝑇𝑟𝐺 + 𝑏𝑢𝑈 + 𝑖𝑑𝐷 − 𝑡𝑤[𝑤𝑁 + 𝑇𝑟
𝐺 + 𝑏𝑢𝑈] − 𝑡𝜋[Π − 𝑖𝑐𝑟𝐶𝑅] − 𝑡𝜋[𝑖𝑐𝑟𝐶𝑅 + 𝑖𝑑𝐷] or: 
 
(15.b) 
𝐵
𝐾
= 𝜉 = 𝛾 + (1 − 𝑡𝑤) [𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
(1 − 𝜒) + 𝜌] + (1 − 𝑡𝜋)𝑖𝑑Δ − 𝑡𝑤𝑤
𝛽
𝛼
− 𝑡𝜋𝑟 
 
Equations (16) and (17), finally, try to formalize in the simplest way possible some financial aspects 
of the economy. In particular, equation (16) says that banks establish interest rate icr on private loans 
by applying a mark-up rate μ on the interest on public bonds. In equation (17), in turn, the interest rate 
id on public debt depends on several factors. First, it is a positive function of the current public budget 
deficit over GDP B/Y = b=ξ/βχ12. The higher is public budget deficit, or the lower is public budget 
surplus, the higher will be the interest rate national governments will have to pay on issued public 
bonds. Second, and perhaps more relevantly, the dynamics of the interest rate on public debt 
fundamentally relies upon the degree of monetary sovereignty characterizing the economy. In our 
model, we capture this point through the institutional variable Ω in equation (17). More in detail, we 
conceive Ω as a bivariate variable taking value 1 in the case of a monetarily sovereign country like the 
US, or 0 in the case of, say, eurozone Member States that issue bonds denominated in a supranational 
“foreign” currency. In a monetarily sovereign country, public bonds are usually taken as risk-free 
assets, since that they are denominated in the currency issued by the domestic central bank, and 
because the domestic central bank will likely intervene any time it likes in order to prevent default 
risks to emerge. Accordingly, we assume id to be insensitive to the evolution of the public deficit 
(surplus) over GDP. As shown in Section 2 of this paper, this assumption seems to be underpinned by 
some recent empirical evidence showing that government bonds yields do not respond to economic 
fundamentals such as the solidity of public finances, the growth rate of the economy and surpluses in 
the current account of the Balance of Payments in the context of “stand-alone” (read monetarily 
sovereign) countries (see De Grauwe and Ji, 2013)13. The institutional setting of the eurozone is rather 
                                                        
11 The same logic may apply in presence of a reduction of public benefits to unemployed people that perhaps makes 
average expected income lower.  
12 In this model, we assume the interest rate id to be a (positive) function of public budget deficit (over GDP) only, and not 
of the overall public debt-to-GDP ratio. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption. Yet, whilst it makes mathematical 
passages more tractable, it does not change the meaning or the results of our analysis.    
13 De Grauwe and Ji (2013), in their analysis of the determinants of government bonds’ spreads in both Eurozone countries 
and “stand-alone” economies, explicitly state that “ [in the case of “stand-alone” economies] financial markets do not seem 
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different. In fact, eurozone rules impose national governments to find resources on private financial 
markets only, and forbid the ECB from buying public bonds (at least on the primary market) and 
directly financing national governments. The solidity of eurozone national finances is in the hands of 
financial operators’ will. Therefore, the above mentioned positive link between id and b will hold true. 
 
(16) 𝑖𝑐𝑟 = (1 + 𝜇)𝑖𝑑 
 
(17) 𝑖𝑑 = 𝜙 (
𝐵
𝑌
, 𝛺)  with  (𝜕𝜙/𝜕(
𝐵
𝑌
)) > 0 if Ω = 0; (𝜕𝜙/𝜕𝑖𝑐𝑏) = 0 if Ω = 1 
 
3.1 The short-run macroeconomic effects of public transfers’ cuts 
 
In our simple model, we can find out an explicit expression for the level of capacity utilization χ that 
ensures the equilibrium in the goods market. Analytically, by plugging equations (10.B) – (13) into (9) 
and, then, into (3), and by taking into account equations (16) – (17), we get: 
 
(18) 𝜒 =
(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)+[(1−𝑠𝜋)(1−𝑡𝜋)+𝜐]𝑟+𝜎+𝛾+𝜖𝑞𝑞−[(1−𝑠𝜋)(1−𝑡𝜋)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙(.)
[𝛽−(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤−𝑏𝑢)+𝜖𝜒]
        
 
In a very Keynesian fashion, equation (18) simply states that current capacity utilization is a 
positive function of all demand injections, whilst it depends negatively on those factors that reduce 
investments.  
Let us now assume that, according to the expansionary austerity literature, the government 
implements a restrictive fiscal adjustment such that the cyclically adjusted primary deficit over GDP 
decreases by an amount equal to – θ. Moreover, in line with the advice of the supporters of 
expansionary austerity, assume that fiscal consolidation mainly takes the form of a cut in public 
transfers (i.e. dTrG < 0). In terms of our model, if we define the cyclically adjusted primary deficit 
(over GDP) as 𝑏∗ =
1
𝛽
[𝛾 + (1 − 𝑡𝑤)𝜌 − 𝑡𝑤𝑤 − 𝑡𝜋(𝑟 + 𝑖𝑑Δ)], we get: 
   
(19) 𝑑𝑏∗ = −𝜃 =
(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝑑𝜌 =
(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽𝐾
𝑑𝑇𝑟𝐺, so that: 𝑑𝑇𝑟𝐺 = −
𝛽𝐾
(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝜃 
 
with θ > 0. 
 
In our model, such a fiscal adjustment has a direct and simultaneous short-run effect on both current 
capacity utilization χ and overall public balance over GDP, b. In fact, totally differentiating χ and b, 
and taking into account the sign of equation (19), we get a system of 2 simultaneous equations for dχ 
and db:    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
to be concerned with the size of the government debt and of the fiscal space and their impacts on the spreads of stand-alone 
countries, despite the fact that the variation of these ratios is of a similar order of magnitude as the one observed in the 
Eurozone (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013, p. 24)”.  
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(S.1) 
{
 
 
 
 𝑑𝜒 =
−[𝑓𝑡𝑤
𝑒 (1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)𝑑𝑡𝑤
𝑒 −𝑓
𝑇𝑟𝐺
(𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)𝛽𝐾𝜃]−(1−𝑠𝑤)𝛽𝐾𝜃−[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙𝑏𝑑𝑏
[𝛽−(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤−𝑏𝑢)+𝜖𝜒]
𝑑𝑏 = −
𝐾
𝜒
𝜃 − [
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
] 𝑑𝜒
 
 
with 𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑒 > 0; 𝑓𝑇𝑟𝐺 < 0; (𝜙𝑏|Ω) ≥ 0; 𝑑𝑡𝑤
𝑒 < 0 
 
Equations (20) and (21) below give us the solutions dχS and dbS of the system (S.1) reported above. 
What emerges is that there is not any clear outcome of the restrictive fiscal policy we have assumed. In 
particular, the sign of equation (20) may be either positive, confirming the expansionary austerity 
hypothesis, or negative, in line with the traditional Keynesian concern about the recessionary effects of 
fiscal retrenchments. The same applies to equation (21). Public transfers’ cuts might help reducing 
public deficit over GDP or, alternatively, they may be counterproductive and lead to an even higher 
deficit-to-GDP ratio in the event they trigger a contraction of current economic activity. At least 
theoretically, mixed results may also emerge, according to which fiscal adjustments contribute to 
reduce fiscal deficit even though they induce a recession14.  
 
(20) 𝑑𝜒𝑆 =
[𝑓𝑡𝑤
𝑒 (1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)]|𝑑𝑡𝑤
𝑒 |
⏞                  
+ 𝑜𝑟 0
−[(1−𝑠𝑤)−𝑓𝑇𝑟𝐺(𝑏𝑢
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)]𝛽𝐾𝜃
⏞                    
−
+[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)
𝐾
𝜒
𝜙𝑏𝜃
⏞                      
+ 𝑜𝑟 0
{[𝛽−(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤−𝑏𝑢)+𝜖𝜒]−[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙𝑏[
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
]}
 
 
 
(21) 𝑑𝑏𝑆 = −
𝐾𝜃
𝜒
− [
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
] 𝑑𝜒𝑆 
 
Despite such indeterminacy, a few points are worth stressing: 
1. The expansionary outcome of fiscal adjustment heavily depends on the intensity of partial derivative 
𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑒 , and of |𝑑𝑡𝑤
𝑒 |, i.e. the expected reduction (here reported in absolute value) in the tax burden 
levied on households. The higher and the quicker is |𝑑𝑡𝑤
𝑒 |, the more rapidly and robustly private 
consumptions may respond positively to public budget’s cuts. Interestingly, and perhaps 
paradoxically, it is reasonable to imagine that such positive expectations will hardly materialize in 
an economy characterized by a high public debt stock, i.e. the economic scenario in which, 
according to the supporters of expansionary austerity, fiscal consolidation is primarily needed. 
Indeed, when public debt D is considerably high and a prolonged period of fiscal consolidation is 
foreseen, people will likely expect future tax reductions to be modest and take place much farther 
ahead (at least with respect to current spending cuts). In a way, following Demopoulos and 
Yannacopoulus (2012), a high degree of uncertainty may “surround” the extent and the timing of 
future tax cuts. In such a context, the “expectation channel” through which expansionary austerity 
may work is extremely weak at best, and likely more than compensated by the overwhelming 
contractionary effect of current public transfers’ cuts. 
                                                        
14 Into such a scenario, dbS would be negative thanks to the direct cut in public transfers even in presence of a negative 
value of dχS, i.e. a contraction of short-run economic activity that tends to increase government outlays and government 
deficit. 
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2. Public transfers’ cuts, expansionary austerity proponents say, may also boost growth by reducing 
public deficit, hence interest rate id on public bonds and, above all, interest rate icr on banks’ loans 
to the private sector. Such a reduction in the cost of external financing may in fact spur private 
investments and induce the economy to expand. According to our model, however, such an effect of 
fiscal adjustments on interest rates does not take place in monetarily sovereign economies. Indeed, 
following equations (16) and (17), in the case of monetarily sovereign countries, the “financial 
market channel” through which fiscal consolidation may affect economic dynamics simply 
disappears (since that ϕb=0). Accordingly, in equation (20), the allegedly expansionary impact of 
fiscal consolidation turns out to be even weaker at the very best. In the end, in the case of “stand-
alone” countries, faith in fiscal adjustments as useful policy options to reduce government bonds’ 
interest rates and, by this way, make banks’ credit more accessible to private actors, is misplaced 
and ungrounded. 
     The “financial market channel” might be at work in the case of eurozone countries that issue public 
bonds denominated in a supranational currency, and in which the solidity of public finances and of 
the overall financial system hinge upon financial markets’ sentiments. In such a context, one could 
be persuaded that front-loaded fiscal adjustments might reassure financial markets about the 
sustainability of eurozone countries’ fiscal positions and that, eventually, they might more easily 
entail expansionary effects. Of course, this logic may hold true if designed fiscal adjustments 
effectively lower public deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios. Yet, we are very far from taking such a 
possible effect of fiscal consolidation as guaranteed. Indeed, recent empirical evidence show that it 
is hard to find a way out from public balance disarrays without sustained growth (Ali Abbas et al., 
2013)15, and that fiscal multipliers may be high and positive when economies are in the midst of a 
recession or are operating below potential (Batini et al., 2012; Baum et al., 2012; Qazizada and 
Stockhammer, 2015). If so, too severe and premature fiscal retrenchments may actually induce a 
short-run deterioration in fiscal and financial variables, instead of improving them, by jeopardizing 
growth performances16.  
     In terms of our model, such an undesirable outcome of public transfers’ cuts emerges clearly from 
the above two expressions for dχ and db. Let assume, for instance, that at the beginning of a fiscal 
austerity program the “expectation channel” is weak, and/or interest rates do not respond promptly 
or enough intensively to the announcement of public budget cuts. In such a context, fiscal austerity 
likely reduces the economic activity and makes dχ negative. Economic slowdown (or recession), in 
turn, tends to frustrate initial government’s efforts to squeeze budget deficits or run fiscal surpluses 
due to the negative impact it carries out on public budget via automatic stabilizers. Very likely, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, if not the deficit-to-GDP ratio, will increase rather than decrease17 (see 
                                                        
15 Ali Abbas et al. (2013) analyze 26 episodes of large debt reversals in advanced economies. They find out that “periods of 
decreasing debt were often associated with higher growth rates and strong primary balances [...] Historically, debt 
reductions have tended to be smaller and less frequent in more challenging macroeconomic environments of moderate 
growth (Ali Abbas et al., 2013, p. 3)”.  
16 Ali Abbas et al. (2013) also note that “front-loaded consolidations have tended to increase public debt in the short run 
[…] Empirically, fiscal effort has been more likely to reduce public debt when growth has been stronger [whilst] the debt-
to-GDP ratio increases in the short run when fiscal consolidations come at the cost of lower economic activity. [In the end] 
while credibility effects can ease the pain of fiscal adjustment through lower risk premiums, this is unlikely to fully offset 
the short-run adverse impact on economic activity (Ali Abbas et al., 2013, p. 3)”.  
17 In a discrete time framework, it is possible to show through simple mathematical passages that ∆(𝐷 𝑌⁄ ) = (𝐷𝑡 𝑌𝑡⁄ ) −
(𝐷𝑡−1 𝑌𝑡−1⁄ ) = (∆𝐷 𝑌𝑡⁄ ) − (𝐷𝑡−1 𝑌𝑡⁄ )𝑔𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 − (𝐷𝑡−1 𝑌𝑡⁄ )𝑔𝑡. On the basis of the model developed in this paper, both the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio bt and the current growth rate gt can be expressed as a function of fiscal measures undertaken at time t. 
Accordingly, a reduction, if ever, in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, as possibly triggered off by restrictive fiscal measures, may 
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Figure B1 in Appendix B). In our model, a rise in the deficit-to-GDP ratio will put further strain on 
financial markets and induces a second round contraction of economic activity.  
     Interestingly, things may get dramatically worse in presence of a strong “credibility channel” and 
financial operators that overreact to changes in public deficits (i.e. ϕb >> 0), but improvements in 
public balance that are over-dependent on changes in domestic economic activity (i.e. ((1 – tw)(bu/α) 
+ b)/χ >> 0), and austerity measures that are even slightly contractionary on the onset. In such a 
context, the denominator in equation (20) may turn out to be negative leading to unstable dynamics. 
In fact, despite discretionary budget cuts could per se reduce public deficits, even a small 
contraction in economic activity eventually makes public disarrays deeper instead of smaller. 
Financial operators get even more frightened by worsening public finance conditions and interest 
rates skyrocket. Economic recession gets deeper and gives rise to an endless “race to the bottom” 
(see Figure B2 in Appendix B), which will inevitably end up in a public debt default and a 
tremendously painful economic dislocation. This kind of dynamics may sadly resemble that one 
observed in Greece since 2010. Eventually, the results of fiscal cuts could be opposite than those 
expected by the supporters of expansionary austerity even when the “financial market” or 
“credibility” channel is judged to be relevant to stabilize macroeconomic real and financial 
variables. 
3. Last but not least, since 2012, the monetary scenario prevailing in the eurozone resembles more 
closely that one characterizing the US since the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis and 
“Great Recession”. Indeed, thanks to Mario Draghi’s pledge that he will do “whatever it takes” to 
save the euro, and after the launch of the OMT program, financial speculation on peripheral 
countries’ government bonds has calmed down. Interest rates id have decreased significantly. They 
are currently at historically minimum levels (see Figure A1)18, and may be expected to decline even 
further in the event the ECB would persist in conducting or even strengthen the quantitative easing 
policy recently launched to avoid deflation and try to rescue the eurozone from secular stagnation. 
In such a context, it makes sense to question the effectiveness of the “financial channel” through 
which fiscal austerity is expected to positively contribute to economic recovery. As Roberto Perotti 
himself stresses, “if fiscal consolidations were expansionary in the past because they caused a steep 
decline in interest rates or inflation, it is unlikely that the same mechanism can be relied on in the 
present circumstances, with low inflation and interest rates close to zero (Perotti, 2012, p.309)”.       
 
3.2 The short-run macroeconomic effects of lower unemployment benefits 
 
An additional proposition of the expansionary austerity doctrine is that fiscal adjustments should also 
aim at reforming the labor market, directly or indirectly. Cuts in public wages or public employment, 
for instance, may induce wage rate moderation, this way improving the external competitiveness of the 
economy. An increasing external demand for domestic goods may in turn foster economic activity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
turn out to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for prompting a negative variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, 
an austerity-led contraction in economic activity (i.e. a negative value of gt) may seriously jeopardize any austerity-based 
attempt to put under control the debt-to-GDP ratio. Other way around, austerity packages’ successfulness in stabilizing and 
reducing debt-to-GDP ratios heavily depends on austerity’s highly uncertain short-run positive effect on current economic 
activity.        
18 Greece obviously represents an exception into the much safer and more stable financial scenario induced in the eurozone 
by the so-called “Draghi put” since late 2012. Needless to say, the new hike in Greek government bonds’ interest rates is a 
consequence of the intense political and economic tensions Greece has recently gone through due to the uncertain outcome 
of the bargaining process with its foreign institutional creditors on the concession of a third financial rescue plan.   
24 
 
growth. The same logic applies to the reductions in the provision of the welfare system, which takes 
the form of lower unemployment benefits bu. In fact, a reduction in the “non-labour” income workers 
would get in the event of unemployment would force trade unions to bargain a lower nominal wage 
rate w. 
In our model, the short-run effects of these additional fiscal austerity measures are formalized in 
system (S.2): 
  
(S.2)
{
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝜒 =
(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝛽/𝛼)[(1−𝜒)+(𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏𝑢)𝜒]𝑑𝑏𝑢⏞                                
−
+𝜖𝑞(𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤)(𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏𝑢)𝑑𝑏𝑢⏞                  
+
−[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙𝑏
⏞                    
+
𝑑𝑏
[𝛽−(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤−𝑏𝑢)+𝜖𝜒]
𝑑𝑏 =
(1−𝑡𝑤)(1−𝜒)
𝛼𝜒
𝑑𝑏𝑢 − [
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
] 𝑑𝜒
 
 
with (𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏𝑢) > 0; (𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤) < 0; 𝑑𝑏𝑢 < 0. 
 
Equations (22) and (23) give the solutions of system (S.2):  
 
(22) 𝑑𝜒𝑆2 =
{(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝛽/𝛼)[(1−𝜒)+(𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏𝑢)𝜒]+𝜖𝑞(𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤)(𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏𝑢)−[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙𝑏
(1−𝑡𝑤)(1−𝜒)
𝛼𝜒
}
⏞                                                                              
?
𝑑𝑏𝑢
{[𝛽−(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)
𝛽
𝛼
(𝑤−𝑏𝑢)+𝜖𝜒]−[(1−𝑠𝑤)(1−𝑡𝑤)𝜆+ℎ](1+𝜇)𝜙𝑏[
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
]}
 
 
 
(23) 𝑑𝑏𝑆2 =
(1−𝑡𝑤)(1−𝜒)
𝛼𝜒
𝑑𝑏𝑢 − [
(1−𝑡𝑤)(𝑏𝑢/𝛼)
𝜒
+
𝑏
𝜒
] 𝑑𝜒𝑆2 
 
Once again, it stands out clearly than no clear-cut solutions exist, and that the theoretical basis of 
the expansionary austerity doctrine is extremely weak. In particular, when the direct and indirect 
effects (i.e. the decrease in monetary wages w) of cuts in unemployment benefits are taken into 
account, the immediate outcome of such measures is lower demand injections in the form of lower 
consumption expenditures. According to the abundant literature theoretical and empirical literature on 
wage-led nature of economic activity and growth (see Ozlem and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 
2015), this would certainly deepen recession instead of prompting recovery. Of course, the contraction 
in the domestic component of aggregate demand might well be compensated by an increasing external 
demand for homemade goods that might emerge in presence of lower domestic nominal wages w and, 
thus, of a depreciated real exchange rate q. However, increasing net exports and, possibly, booming 
economic activity, strongly rely upon the sensitiveness of net exports to the real exchange rate (i.e. 
parameter 𝜖𝑞 in equation (22)), which in turn is conditional to the sectorial composition of net exports 
themselves and to the degree of openness of the economy (see Taylor, 1991, ch.7). In this regards, it is 
perhaps not by chance that one of the most cited examples of successful expansionary austerity is that 
one taking place in Ireland in late 1980s. Indeed, Ireland is now a small open economy that is highly 
integrated on international goods markets, and that exports a restricted but highly dynamic variety of 
manufactured products (see pharmaceutical products, for instance). At the end of the 1980s Irish 
exports were already accounting for more than 50 percent of Irish GDP. Interestingly, Perotti (2012) 
himself recognizes that a fundamental pillar of late 1980s Irish economic rebound was the solid 
expansion of Irish exports due to domestic wage moderation and fast reduction in inflation plus the 
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initial one-shot devaluation of the Irish pound, the stabilization of the British sterling, and the 
economic expansion of Britain, i.e. Ireland’s most important trade partner. Now: it is worth noting that, 
first, part of the above policy recipe, i.e. the devaluation of the domestic currency, is not available in 
eurozone countries any longer. Second, it is questionable that a small peripheral eurozone country like 
Greece could currently follow and adopt that same development pattern. Indeed, Greece is a small, 
relatively closed19 and largely de-industrialized20 economy. Accordingly, there are reasonable doubts 
that the emphasis on internal devaluation as sponsored by the supporters of the expansionary austerity 
would currently give rise in Greece to the same results as wage moderation supposedly did in Ireland 
when combined with other no-more available policy options, and when applied in a much more 
favorable worldwide economic scenario. 
As to the operativeness of the “financial channel”, the same line of reasoning developed in section 
3.1 applies also to the case of cuts in unemployment benefits. It might have some relevance, but only 
in the case of non-fully monetarily sovereign economies, and according to the real effectiveness of 
fiscal adjustments in squeezing public balance deficits over GDP without throwing the economy in a 
deep recession. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we provide a critical analysis of the expansionary austerity theory. We first review the 
critiques to the expansionary austerity doctrine from an empirical point of view. According to these 
critiques, the econometric techniques on which the expansionary austerity literature largely relies upon 
are fundamentally flawed because they are biased towards estimating lower (than effective) or even 
negative fiscal multipliers. We then present a short-run model in order to address the theoretical 
weaknesses of the expansionary austerity theory. In particular, we show that the expansionary 
outcomes of well-designed fiscal adjustments might materialize only in specific economic 
environments and under peculiar circumstances. For sure, they cannot be taken for granted and they do 
not represent the results of a well-established universal law. 
First, we show that the downsizing of the welfare state might boost private consumption only under 
the unrealistic condition that expected and uncertain future reductions in the tax burden will more than 
compensate for the current, permanent and certain cut in public transfers.  
Second, the “financial channel” through which fiscal corrections may crowd in private investments 
does not seem to work in the case of monetarily sovereign economies. It could perhaps work in the 
case of eurozone countries, but only if fiscal consolidation does effectively trigger off a reduction in 
the public deficit-to-GDP ratio, and thus helps to create a safer financial environment. However, such a 
virtuous effect of fiscal consolidation on public balance’s solidity is all but certain in the short run. 
Quite on the contrary, recent empirical evidence tends to suggest that front-loaded fiscal adjustments 
actually increase the debt-to-GDP ratio, if not the public deficit, due to their recessive impacts on 
economic activity.  
                                                        
19 According to trade data provided by UNCTAD, in 2013, Greek exports in good and services account for less than 28 
percent of Greek GDP. 
20 In 2013, Greece’s exports of manufactured goods accounted for the 30 percent of total Greek merchandise exports only. 
Even further, in 2013, the manufacturing GDP share is equal to less than 9 percent (it was barely higher than 15 percent in 
1987). In the case of Ireland, since 1987, the manufacturing GDP share has never decreased below 19 percent, even in 
periods of bad worldwide recessions and decreasing international trade flows.  
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Last but not least, austerity measures aiming at restoring external competitiveness through internal 
devaluation (read wage moderation) might be expansionary only in the case of economic systems that 
are deeply integrated on international goods markets, and that exports highly price elastic products. 
Historically, this was the economic setting characterizing a few episodes of expansionary fiscal 
adjustments that were implemented together with some additional policy measures such as the 
devaluation of the domestic currency first and foremost. However, a small peripheral eurozone country 
like Greece does not currently show any of those features characterizing Ireland at the end of the 
1980s. Moreover, the toolkit of eurozone policymakers is now much narrower than it was thirty years 
ago. Accordingly, there are very good reasons to question the current validity of the expansionary 
austerity mantra. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1 – Interest rates on 10-year government bonds (monthly data) in selected developed 
economies, 1999 – (august) 2015. 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, issue 11 (2015).   
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Appendix B 
 
In Figures B1 and B2 we describe more explicitly how changes in economic activity (as formalized in 
the first equation reported in system (S.1)) and variations in public deficit-to-GDP ratios (see the 
second equation in system (S.1)) do interact.  
In the upper panels of Figures B1 and B2 we report the left-hand-side (LHS) of equation 1 in 
system (S.1), i.e. a 45-degree sloping curve, as well as its right-hand-side (RHS). Note that the RHS 
curve depends on dχ due to the positive feedback economic expansion has on its own dynamics via its 
effect on the evolution of the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Changes in the position of the RHS curve do 
depend on the “autonomus” direct effects discretionary budget cuts (i.e. θ) have on economic activity 
via the “expectation channel” and the “financial channel”. Upward shifts of the RHS curve stand for 
austerity measures that are expansionary on the onset. Donward movements of the RHS curve are due 
to an initial austerity-led contraction in economic activity. 
In the bottom panels of Figures B1 and B2 we show how, according to the second equation in 
system (S.1), deficit-to-GDP ratios react negatively (positively) to economic expansions (recessions). 
The responsiveness of the deficit-to-GDP ratio to changing economic activity (i.e. the slope of the 
“db” curve) is lower (i.e. a relatively flat “db” curve) in the first “stable” scenario than in the second 
“unstable” one (in which we assume a relatively steeper “db” curve). The position of the “db” curve in 
Figures B1 and B2 depends on the negative direct effect austerity measures induce on public defcitis. 
 
Figure B1 – Austerity-led economic contraction and rising deficit-to-GDP ratios in a stable short-run 
setting. 
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Figure B2 – Austerity-led “endless” economic contraction and explosive deficit-to-GDP (and debt-to-
GDP) dynamics in an unstable short-run setting. 
 
 
 
In Figures B1 and B2 we portray the effects of discretionary budget cuts that are contractionary on 
the onset (the RHS curve in Figures B1 and B2 moves downward). Differences between the two 
worrisome dynamics we describe in Figures B1 and B2 lie in the stable (see Figure B1) or unstable 
nature (see Figure B2) characterizing them.     
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